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Article 4

COMMENTS
THE UNRUH CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
As Applied to Real Estate Brokers
By

JOSEPH C. RHINE

and

STANLEY

A.

ZIMMERMAN'

THE

FULL AND EQUAL RIGHT of the California citizen to commercial service and accommodation has, in some degree, been protected
by state legislation since 1872.1 In that year, the innkeeper and the
common carrier were required to provide their services by the Penal
Code which probably prohibited discrimination. In 1893 a statute was
enacted to specifically prohibit discrimination by operators of places
of "public amusement or entertainment." In 1897 "public accommodations" was added, and "inns, restaurants, and hotels" were included
in the statute. "Public conveyances" was added to the section in 1919.
By 1959 section 51 of the Civil Code included specific references to:
"[IInns, restaurants, hotels, eating-houses, places where ice cream or
soft drinks of any kind are sold for consumption on the premises, barber
shops, bath houses, theaters, skating rinks, public conveyances and all
other places of accommodation or amusement."
In 1959 the legislature passed three statutes. Employers of more
than five persons were prohibited from discriminating in the hiring of
employees; 2 persons selling or renting "publicly assisted" housing accommodations were required to act without discrimination; 3 and operators of "all business establishments of every kind whatsoever" were
made subject to civil actions if they denied their services because of
the race, color, religion, ancestry or national origin of the citizen. 4
Historically, these statutes demonstrate that the legislature has
broadened the scope of the right given to the citizen. Horowitz, in his
article on the Unruh Civil Rights Act, points out that the earlier statutes were designed to prevent the public humiliation of the citizen
who was discriminated against. The present sections, Horowitz continues, protect the citizen from a more subjective psychological injury
whether or not he is in "public view."
Members, Third Year class.
For a comprehensive history of these statutes and their influence on the Unruh
Civil Rights Act see Horowitz, California Equal Rights Statute, 33 So. CAL. L. REv.
260 (1959).
2 CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1410-32.
3 CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE §§ 35700-41.
4 CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 51, 52.
1
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It is also apparent that each successive statute passed by the legislature has resulted in subjecting a broader area of economic activity
to a statutory duty. In 1959 particularly, the three statutes passed are
directed at increased economic protection of the citizen who is subject
to discrimination. In that year, the legislature undertook to insure
equal economic opportunity for all citizens in the areas of employment, publicly assisted housing, and "all business establishments of
every kind whatsoever."
Application of Sections 51 and 52 to Real Estate Brokers
Section 51 of the Civil Code states:
All citizens within the jurisdiction of this state are free and
equal, and no matter what their race, color, religion, ancestry, or
national origin are entitled to the full and equal accommodations,
advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.
This section shall not be construed to confer any right or privilege
on a citizen which is conditioned or limited by law or which is applicable alike to citizens of every color, race, religion, ancestry, or national origin.
Section 52 reads as follows:
Whoever denies, or who aids, or incites such denial, or whoever
makes any discrimination, distinction or restriction on account of
color, race, religion, ancestry, or national origin, contrary to the provisions of section 51 of this code, is liable for each and every such
offense for the actual damages, and two hundred fifty dollars ($250)
in addition thereto, suffered by any person denied the rights provided in section 51 of this code.
Plain Meaning
The application of any statute is determined by the plain meaning
of the words on its face. "When statutory language is clear, legislative
intent must be ascertained therefrom, and there is no room from [sic]
construction or interpretation."'
This statute specifically refers to "all business establishments of
every kind whatsoever." The real estate broker must be licensed as a
business in California and maintain a definite place of business within
the state. Section 10130 of the Business and Professions Code stipulates: "It is unlawful for any person to engage in the business, act in
the capacity of, advertise or assume to act as a real estate broker or a
real estate salesman within this state without first obtaining a real
estate license from the division." (Emphasis added.) Section 10162
adds:
Every licensed real estate broker shall have and maintain a definite place of business in the State of California which shall serve as
545 CAL. JuR. 2d, Statutes, § 127 (1958).
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his office for the transaction of business. This office shall be the place
where his license is displayed and where personal consultations with
clients are held.
No real estate license authorizes the licensee to do business except
from the location stipulated in the real estate license.
Notice in writing shall be given the commissioner of change of
business location of a real estate broker, whereupon the commissioner
shall issue a new license for the unexpired period. (Emphasis added.)
Section 10163 also stipulates:
If the applicant for a real estate broker's license maintains more
than one place of business within the state he shall apply for and
procure an additional license for each branch office so maintained
by him. Every such application shall state the name of the person
and the location of the place or places of business for which such
license is desired. The commissioner may determine whether or not
a real estate broker is doing a real estate brokerage business at or
from any particular location which requires him to have a branch
office license. (Emphasis added.)
It is clear that these code sections provide for licensing a broker as a
business establishment.
No business establishment is excepted by the plain meaning of the
words of section 51. Indeed, the contrary is affirmatively stated in the
phrase, "of every kind whatsoever." Therefore, as the statutory language is not ambiguous and permits only one construction, it must be
concluded that section 51 applies to the business establishment of the
real estate broker. "The courts may not speculate that the legislature
meant something other than what it said. Nor may they rewrite a statute to make it express an intention not expressed therein."
This conclusion is supported by an opinion of the attorney general
of the State of California: "The provisions of Civil Code section 51
apply to the advantages, facilities, privileges, and services supplied by
real estate brokers and real estate salesmen in regard to the selling
transferring, renting, leasing, or rental managing of real property."Legislative History of Section 51
The attorney general's opinion is supported by the legislative history of the bill as it was molded into its final form. A basic principle
of statutory construction is that ".

.

. a construction that will promote

the legislative intention, purpose and policy will override a construction that would defeat it."8 The history of this bill shows that the regulation of all business establishments of every kind whatsoever resulted
in excluding regulation in areas other than business establishments.
6 Id. at § 128.
7 34 Ops. AT-r'y GEN. 230, 231 (1959).
'45

CAL.

Jt.

2d, Statutes, § 126 (1958).
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As originally introduced, A. B. 594 (later to become the present
Civil Code 51, the Unruh Civil Rights Act) was an attempt to cover
all types of activities:
All citizens within the jurisdiction of this state, no matter what
their race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin, are entitled to
the full and equal admittance, accommodations, advantages, facilities, membership, and privileges in, or accorded by, all public or
private groups, organizations, associations, business establishments,
schools, and public facilities; to purchase real property; and to obtain
the services of any professional person, group or association.
This version of the bill was similar to the section 51 in existence at
that time, which also had a list of areas to be regulated. However,
there had been great difficulty interpreting section 51 in the cases
arising under it because of the restrictive nature of the specified areas
of regulation, followed by the phrase "and all other places of public
accommodation."9 Similarly, as the classifications of A. B. 594 became
more numerous and involved, the phrase "set out, but not limited by
this section" was added to the bill.
The legislature again changed the bill before passage. From the
activities regulated, the legislature removed public and private groups,
organizations, associations, schools, public facilities, the purchasing
of real property, and the obtaining of the services of any professional
person, group or association. Of the rights granted, full and equal admittance and membership were removed, and full and equal "services"
was added. Of all the activities originally listed, only "business establishments" remained. This one classification not only remained but
was strengthened by the addition of "of every kind whatsoever."
This particular classification was what the legislature intended to
cover with section 51. The other areas were left for other laws, thus
eliminating the problems of interpretation, of exclusion and inclusion,
and the clause "set out, but not limited by this section." The law was
now clear. One definite criteria was established.
As earlier stated, real estate brokers are licensed as business establishments under the code. The removal of the phrase "to purchase real
property," or any of the other deleted phrases, would seem to be insignificant as far as the legislature's intention to cover either the real
estate brokerage business or any other business. One member of the
legislature commented that he did not press for the passage of A. B. 444,
9 Held to be "places of public accommodation": Lambert v. Mendel's of California,
156 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 855, 319 P.2d 469 (1957); Suttles v. Hollywood Turf Club, 45
Cal. App. 2d 283, 114 P.2d 27 (1941); Evans v. Fong Poy, 42 Cal. App. 2d 320, 108

P.2d 942 (1941). Held not to be "places of public accommodation": James v. Marinship
Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944); Reed v. Hollywood Professional School,
169 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 887, 338 P.2d 633 (1959); Coleman v. Middlestaff, 147 Cal.

App. 2d Supp. 833, 305 P.2d 1020 (1957); Long v. Mountain View Cemetery Ass'n,
130 Cal. App. 2d 328, 278 P.2d 945 (1955).
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which was also aimed at regulating the real estate broker with an
added provision for his delicensing when it became obvious that the
Unruh Civil Rights Act would pass. 10

Constitutionality of Section 51
There appears to be no strong argument for holding the Unruh
Civil Rights Act unconstitutional. The regulation of business in order
to insure civil rights is a legitimate police power of the state. It has
been stated that: "The police power of a state under our Constitutional
system is adequate for the protection of the civil rights of its citizens
against discrimination by reason of race or color. . ...
11
When applied to real estate brokers, other state laws and city
ordinances have not yet been declared unconstitutional, 12 and many
articles 13 have come to the conclusion that the New York ordinance is
clearly constitutional. Certainly the Supreme Court does not favor
using the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment to find civil rights legislation unconstitutional. 4 Justice
Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, states:' 5
[i1t is urged that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment precludes the State of New York from prohibiting racial
and religious discrimination against those seeking employment. Elaborately to argue against this contention is to dignify a claim devoid
of constitutional substance. Of course a state may leave abstention
from such discrimination to the conscience of individuals. On the
other hand, a state may choose to put its authority behind one of the
cherished aims of American feeling of forbidding indulgence in racial
or religious prejudice to another's hurt. To use the Fourteenth
Amendment as a sword against such state power would be to stultify that Amendment. Certainly the insistence by individuals on their
private prejudices as to race, color or creed, in relations like those
now before us, ought not to have a higher constitutional sanction than
the determination of a state to extend the area of non-discrimination
beyond that which the Constitution itself exacts.
Therefore, the constitutionality of section 51 of the Civil Code would
seem unquestionable.
10 Interview with Assemblyman Philip Burton, July 19, 1961.

11 Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28, 41 (1947) (Douglas, J., concurring).
2
1 SEssioN LAws OF COLORADO ch. 148 (1959); N.Y.C. ADMi.
CODE ch. 41,
§X41-1.o b (1).
13 58 CoLuM. L. REv. 728 (1958); 56 Mic. L. REv. 1223 (1958); 6 N.Y.L.F. 13
(1960); 107 U. PA. L. REv. 515 (1959).
14 Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1947); Railway Mail Ass'n v.
Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1944).
15 Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, supra note 14, at 98.
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Summary
In amending sections 51 and 52 of the Civil Code, in 1959, by the
Unruh Civil Rights Act, the legislature directly regulated real estate
brokers. A contrary construction would defeat the legislative intention,
purpose, and policy.
1. Real estate brokers are licensed as business establishments under
the laws of California.
2. In clear and unambiguous language, Civil Code section 51 expressly regulates "business establishments of every kind whatsoever" and lists no exceptions.
3. Therefore, Civil Code sections 51 and 52 subject real estate
brokers to liability if they deny full and equal services to a citizen on the basis of race, color, religion, ancestry, or national

origin.
The Discriminatory Listing
The purpose of this section is to examine a general question which
is best posed by these hypothetical events:
A private home owner, who is free to sell directly to whom he
pleases, chooses to go to a broker and hires him to sell the house. The
broker and the home owner enter into a listing contract which, among
other things, authorizes the broker to sell the house to a buyer who
meets the terms and conditions set forth in the contract. One of the
conditions set by the home owner is that the house shall be sold to
Caucasians exclusively. Thereby, the broker, as an agent, is not authorized to sell the house to a non-Caucasian.
A non-Caucasian citizen comes into the broker's office and asks to
buy the house listed with the broker by the private home owner. The
non-Caucasian meets all the terms and conditions set by the owner,
except that of being a Caucasian. The broker refuses to sell the house
to him.
Is the broker liable for denying the services of his business establishment to the non-Caucasiancitizen on the basis of his race?
This general question may best be examined by posing a series of
specific questions which lie within its scope.
Broker's Services to the Prospective Buyer
Is selling a house which is listed with him a business service which
the broker offers to the prospective buyer?
It is clear that the primary motive of the broker in selling the
house is to earn the commission which is due him under the contract
with the owner. His contract duty is owed to the owner, and he cannot act as agent for more than one party in a transaction without the
consent of all parties thereto. Consequently, the sale of the house is
a service which the broker offers the owner, but this does not prevent
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the sale of the house from also being a service which is offered to the
prospective buyer as well.
In California, the responsibility
of the broker is not solely to the
16
person who hires him:
The [real estate] commissioner may . . . [take action when] a
real estate licensee, in performing or attempting to perform any of
the acts within the scope of this chapter, has been guilty of any of
the following:
(a) Making any substantial misrepresentation.
(b) Making any false promises of a character likely to influence,
persuade or induce.
(i)

Any other conduct, whether of the same or a different character than specified in this section, which constitutes fraud
or dishonest dealings.
The commissioner may suspend or revoke the license of any real
estate licensee .. .who has done any of the following:
(c) Knowingly authorized, directed, connived at or aided in the
publication, advertisement, distribution, or circulation of any
material false statement or representation concerning his
business or any land or subdivision . . .offered for sale.
A service is defined as "performance of labor for the benefit of
another, or at another's command, " 17 or as "any work performed for
the benefit of another; a benefit or advantage conferred." 8 The California code defines the real estate broker as follows: "A real estate
broker within the meaning of this part is a person who, for compensation or in expectation of a compensation, sells or offers for sale, buys
or offers to buy, lists or solicits for prospective purchasers, or negotiates the purchase or sale or exchange of real estate ... ""a
It is common for the prospective buyer to seek out the broker
rather than each individual house owner who wishes to sell his house.
Ordinarily, the broker shows a number of houses to the prospective
buyer and makes known the conditions required by each owner. If
the prospective buyer can meet these conditions and wishes to buy,
the broker contracts to sell him the house, or takes the offer to the
prospective seller. These acts are a regular, ordinary part of the broker's
business and are part of the services provided by the broker for the
prospective buyer.

Services Excluded from Statute?
Is any particular business service offered by the broker excluded
from the statute as a matter of legislative intent?
1' CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 10176, 10177.
17 WEBSTER, NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1956).
IFUNK
'9 CAL.

& WAGNALL, NEW PRACTICAL STANDARD DICTIONARY

Bus. &

PROF. CODE

§ 10131.

(1948 ed.).
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No reading of the statute suggests that any particular business
service offered by the broker should be excluded from the scope of the
statute. At no time when the bill was before the legislature was the
word, "services," modified, altered, or further particularized. Historically, the California civil rights statutes have never excluded a particular service which was offered by a place of public accommodation
subject to the statute.
If the elimination in the statute of the phrase, "to purchase real
property," 20 does not prevent the statute from applying to the broker's
business services as a whole, as previously shown, it is difficult to see
how that change could prevent the application of the statute to any
one of them. While some of the services provided by the broker to the
private owner may be more helpfll than others, the act does not make
such a distinction, nor does it provide a guide by which the courts
could make this relative determination.
It must be concluded that the legislature intended the statute to
apply equally to all of the business services offered by the broker.
The Legal Relationship Between Citizen and Broker
What is the legal relationshipbetween the citizen who is "entitled"
to the services and the broker?
Right or Privilege
The statute provides that the citizen is "entitled" to the services.
The word "entitled" by the very nature of the statute itself does not
confer upon the citizen merely a legal privilege to qualify for or receive
the services of the broker. As stated in Reed v. Hollywood Professional
School: "The purpose, of course, is to compel a recognition of the
equality of citizens in the right to the peculiar service afforded. .. ."
(Emphasis added.) 21 If the citizen is authorized to demand or "compel," the citizen has been given a legal right. This legal right is emphasized by the legislature's designation of this section as "the Unruh
Civil Rights Act" and by the language in section 52 of the code: "suffered by any person denied the rights provided in section 51 of this
code."
Positive or Negative
Assuming that the citizens have been given a legal right, it must
still be determined whether this right is positive or negative. With
the following comment is made in Solmond
respect to this distinction,
22

on Jurisprudence:

In respect of their contents, rights are of two kinds, being either
positive or negative. A positive right corresponds to a positive duty,
and is a right that he on whom the duty lies shall do some positive
2O A. B. 594, as amended March 30, 1959.
21 169 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 887, 890, 338 P.2d 633, 635 (1959).
22 SOLMONV, JuusPRuDENcE 283 (11th ed. 1957).
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act on behalf of the person entitled. A negative right corresponds
to a negative duty, and is a right that the person bound shall refrain
from some act which would operate to the prejudice of the person
entitled. The former is a right to be positively benefited; the latter is
merely a right not to be harmed. The former is a right to receive
something more than one already has, such as my right to the money
in the pocket of my debtor; the latter is a right to retain what one
already has, such as my right to the money in my pocket.
G. W. Keeton in his book, Elementary Principles of Jurisprudence,
23
devotes the following passage to this difference:
A positive right corresponds to a positive duty, and a negative
right to a negative duty. A positive duty is one in consequence of
which the person bound by it is compelled to perform some positive
act in favour of the person in whom the right resides. So, if the person
bound infringes the right, it is by omission to do something, and it
therefore follows that the infringement of a positive right, by the
breach of a positive duty, is a negative wrong.... Ordinarily, the
law is content to direct persons to refrain from performing wrongful
acts, rather than to direct them to perform acts worthy of praise or
reward. Accordingly, therefore, the majority of rights conferred, and
duties imposed, by law are negative....
The citizen, by the Unruh Act, has been given the right to the full
and equal services of the business establishment, regardless of his race,
color, religion, ancestry, or national origin. This is similar to Solmond's
illustration of his right to the money in the pocket of his debtor, not to
his right to the money in his own pocket. It is a positive right.

As Solmond remarks

:24

This distinction [between positive and negative rights] is one of
practical importance ....
Every man has a right against every man
that the present position of things shall not be interfered with to his
detriment; whilst it is only in particular cases and for special reasons
that any man has a right against any man that the present position
shall be altered for his advantage. I have a right against every one
not to be pushed into the water; if I have a right at all to be pulled
out, it is only on special grounds against determinate individuals.
In Rem or In Personam
Such a positive right, "on special grounds against determinate individuals," is closely connected with a right in personam, according to
Solmond: "A right in rem, then, is an interest protected against the
world at large; a right in personam is an interest protected
solely
26
25
The comment adds:
against determinate individuals."
23 KEETON, ELEMENTARY
24 SOLMOND,

PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE

op cit. supra note 22, at 283.

25 Id. at 284-85.
26 Id. at 285-86.

141 (2d ed. 1949).
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The distinction between rights in rem and in personam is closely
connected with that between negative and positive rights. Almost
all rights in rem are negative, and most rights in personam are positive, though in a few exceptional cases they are negative. [The product of some agreement.]... No person is in general given a legal
right to the active assistance of all the world.
Keeton remarks on that distinction between rights in rem and in personam that it is to be found in "the number of persons subject to the
duty of respecting them." He concludes: "In the final analysis, a right
in rem is not a single right at all, but a collection of similar rights,
available against each member of the community." 2 7 Solmond stresses
the difference in relationship:28
[lf the law confers upon me a right in rem, it is commonly because I stand in some special relation to the thing which is the object
of the right If, on the contrary, it confers on me a right in personam,
it is commonly because I stand in some special relation to the person
who is the subject of the correlative duty.
The right of the citizen under the Unruh Act is not a right in rem.
It is not available against each member of the community, and it is
conferred on the citizen because, and only when, he stands in a special
relationship with the broker, who is the subject of the correlative duty.
The right is, therefore, a right in personam.
Source of the Right
The most common right in personam is the right which has a contract relationship as its source. The right given to the citizen under
the Act is different in this respect, because it does not depend on the
broker's contract to enter into a business relationship with the citizen
to whom. the service is refused. If it did, the broker could prevent his
liability for the refusal of one of his services by refusing all of them.
Such a construction of the right given to the "citizens" by the legislature would render the bestowal of that right meaningless.
Nevertheless, the source of the right is found in the citizen-broker
relationship. On the broker's side, it is imposed by law. The broker's
conduct, in his brokerage business, can vary only within the limits
imposed by the state which licenses him. So long as he is in the brokerage business, he must hold himself out as a real estate broker to the
public as a whole.
On the other hand, the legal right given to each citizen does not
arise simply because the broker goes into business. If it did, the broker
would be required to seek out the individual citizen and urge him to
-take advantage of his real estate service. At this point, each citizen
has the privilege of requesting the broker's services, but some further
2T

7

28

op. cit. supra note 23, at 142.
SoI.MOND, op. cit. supra note 22, at 288.
EON,
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act on his part is necessary to establish the relationship with the broker
which gives him the legal right.
No statute or regulation prevents the broker from setting out conditions to his service, unless they conflict with the state-protected rights
of others. The broker may require his customers to come to his office,
or insist on proof that a customer has the financial ability to pay for
the type of house he seeks. In these cases, no individual member of
the community has a right to demand the services of the broker without
meeting these conditions.
It is to be concluded that the broker-citizen relationship does not
depend on a contract between them. It arises only when the broker
has begun his licensed business and when the citizen has met the lawful
conditions imposed by the broker for his services.
Corresponding Duty
The legislature, in providing that all citizens "are entitled to the
full and equal ... services . . .,"29 gave them a positive right in personam, which arises, not from a contract, but from their respective acts.
As against that right there necessarily is a corresponding duty on the
part of the broker. That duty, like the right of the citizen, is positive
and in personam, and arises from the relationship between them.
Similar Right-Duty Relationships
Two of the oldest and most prominent situations in which such
positive in personam duties arise are in the case of innkeepers and
public carriers. Historically, "inns, restaurants, [and] hotels" were
three of the first classifications included in the California Civil Rights
Statute, 30 and "public conveyances" was added in 1919. 3 1 Both the
innkeeper and the public carrier owe a positive duty in personam to
the traveler, which does not arise out of a contract. The consequence
of such a duty, as Keeton points out, is that, "the person bound by it
is compelled to perform some positive act in favour of the person in
whom the right resides."32 In Solmond on jurisprudence the duty of
the innkeeper is developed: "An innkeeper is not under a present duty
to admit all travellers; he is under a duty to admit only such as ask
for admittance. When the request for admittance is made the innkeeper's duty to admit is a duty in personam owed to the particular
33
traveller who asks for admittance."
In Orloff v. Hollywood Turf Club,34 the recovery of damages was
denied to a plaintiff who sought to invoke the then existing civil rights
statute, admittedly applicable to a race track, on the ground that the
29

CAL. CIv. CODE

§

51.

30 Cal. Stat. 1897, ch. 108, § 1, p. 137.
31 Cal. Stat. 1919, ch. 210, § 1, p. 309.
32 KEETON, op. cit. supra note 23, at 141.
33 SOLmOND, op. cit. supra note 22, at 497.
34 110 Cal. App. 2d 340, 242 P.2d 660 (1952).
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assertion by the track authorities that the plaintiff would not be admitted in the future, constituted a continuing violation. In denying
the contention, the court of appeals for the second district ruled:35
IThere was no duty or obligation on the part of the defendant
[turf club] to the plaintiff [invitee] arising out of a contractual obligation and none arising out of law, unless and until the plaintiff tendered to the defendant a ticket of admission issued by it or its price
charged to all persons who alike sought admission to its track....
[The mere fact that defendant previously] told the plaintiff he would
not in the future be admitted to the track, and if he was inadvertently admitted would be ejected,... [created] no status or legal
relation of any kind or character between the parties which could
give rise to a future right or duty on the part of one to the other.
Earlier, the court observed: "It is the privilege of an inn, a railroad
or a race track to demand, in advance, pay for the accommodation,
facility or the privilege to be rendered." 36 It is to be concluded that
the duty of the broker, in this respect, is comparable to the duty of the
innkeeper or the common carrier. Like the invitee who seeks admission to the race track, the citizen who seeks the services of the broker
must be prepared to meet the broker's lawful conditions. When he
does so, the broker's positive duty then arises.

Liability
Admittedly, to come under a duty is not necessarily to become.
liable if that duty is violated. As Keeton points out, both the Statute
of Frauds and the Statute of Limitations create such situations.3 7 Section 52 of the Civil Code sets out the liability of violators of the duty
which arises under section 51:8
Whoever denies, or who aids, or incites such denial, or whoever
makes any discrimination, distinction or restriction on account of
color, race, religion, ancestry, or national origin, contrary to the provisions of section 51 of this code, is liable for each and every such
offense for the actual damages, and two hundred fifty dollars ($250)
in addition thereto, suffered by any person denied the rights provided in section 51 of this code.
It is unmistakably clear from the language of section 52 that "whoever makes any discrimination, distinction or restriction on account of
race, color, religion, or national origin, contrary to the provisions of
section 51 of this code is liable . .." Likewise, he who "denies" the
right of the citizen to the equal services specified in section 51 because
of his race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin, becomes liable
under section 52. It is immaterial whether the "denial" of the equal
Id. at 343, 242 P.2d at 662.
36Id. at 342, 242 P.2d at 662.
37 KEETON,
op. cit. supra note 23, at 133.
3
8CAL. Civ. COnE § 52.
-9
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services for any of these specified reasons is occasioned by an affirmafive refusal, or by a failure to provide such equal service. In either
case the citizen is denied the positive right granted to him by the legislature. Section 52, in implementing section 51, sets out the liability
of one who fails to perform the duty imposed on him by section 51 and
assesses the damages to "any person denied the rights provided in
section 51 of this code."
Summary
Upon the citizen meeting the lawful conditions imposed by the
broker, a relationship exists between them. Thereafter:
1. The citizen has a positive right in personam, regardless of his
race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin, to the full and equal
services of the broker in his business establishment.
2. The broker has a positive duty in personam to provide the full
and equal services of his business establishment to the citizen, regardless of his race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin.
3. If the broker denies this right of the citizen to these services, or
fails to perform his duty to provide these services, the broker is liable.
The Agency Contract
How do the restrictive terms of the agency contract agreement
between the broker and the private home owner affect the broker's
duty to the citizen?
The Contract
The private owner, who himself can ordinarily sell without regard
to the statute, conceivably could become liable if some additional
factor were present, such as his "aiding or inciting" the denial of the
broker. The broker, however, is in an entirely different position. By
entering into the contract agreement, the broker places himself in a
position where he may be called upon to perform two conflicting duties
-that is, his contractual duty to the private owner, and his statutory
duty to the citizen. This dilemna and the impending liability are both
of his own making. That liability then follows regardless of whether
he personally favors or opposes the restrictions.
The legislature could have exempted the broker from liability in
those instances where his contract with the private owner contained
the restrictions at the insistance of the owner. This the legislature
chose not to do. If the legislature had done so, the broker could avoid
liability under the shelter of that contract. In that event, the application of the statute to the broker would be completely ineffective.
The Agency
As an agent, the broker lacks the power to sell to a non-Caucasian
because of the terms of his restrictive agreement with the owner. In
addition to his contractualduty, the broker owes a fiduciary duty to
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the owner to carry out the terms of the agreement. The broker's fiduciary duty, like his contractual duty, can not arise without his consent.39
The Restatement of Agency states the common rule: "Manifestations
of Consent. An agency relation exists only if there has been a manifestation by the principal to the agent that the agent may act on his
account, and consent by the agent so to act." 40
As the agency relation requires the broker's consent, he can prevent it from arising. Since he gave his consent, he has undertaken to
provide the services of selling the house to a qualified Caucasian,
knowing that he must deny this same service to a non-Caucasian otherwise qualified. If, by the terms of his agency and the statute, he is
called upon to perform two conflicting duties, the dilemna is likewise
of his own making.
The broker may not escape liability for a wrongful act on the
ground that he acted under the directions of the home owner. The
California Civil Code provides: "One who assumes to act as an agent
is responsible to third persons as a principal for his acts in the course
of his agency, in any of the following cases, and in no others: ...3.

When his acts are wrongful in their nature."41 And the California
Supreme Court has stated: "The true rule is, of course, that the agent
is liable for his own acts, regardless
of whether the principal is liable
42
or amenable to judicial action."

Under the present civil rights statute the home owner is not obligated to give full and equal consideration to all citizens in making
the private sale of his house. Can the argument be made that the
broker is not obligated to provide his services to the non-Caucasian
because the private owner is not so bound?
It is true that an agent may become privileged to do an act which
he would not otherwise be privileged to do because of the privilege of
the principal. "An agent is privileged to do what otherwise would
constitute a tort if his principal is privileged to have an agent do it
and has authorized the agent to do it."43 However, this principle does
not apply to the relationship between the broker and the owner. The
contention that the broker is not bound, because the owner is not so
bound, on analysis, is invalid.
First, the contention assumes that the owner's freedom to sell his
house is a privilege and not, under the present civil rights statute, an
immunity. If it is an immunity it cannot be delegated to the agent. "An
agent does not have the immunities of his principal although acting at
the direction of the principal." 44
PoWELL, AGENcY 238, 243 (1952).
RETATEmENT (SEcom), AGENCY §
41 CAL. Cw.CODE
2343.
42
39

40

§

15 (1958).

James v.Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 742-43, 155 P.2d 329, 341 (1944).
E FsTATEmNT (SEcON), AGENCY § 345 (1958).
41d. at § 347.

43
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The Restatement of Agency45distinguishes between these two freedoms in the following manner:
a. Privilege&. "Privilege" denotes the fact that conduct which under
ordinary circumstances subjects the actor to liability, under particular
circumstances does not subject him thereto .... [I]t [the privilege]
may be created by the law irrespective of consent for the protection
of the rights of an individual or of the state.
b. Immunities. "Immunity" is a word which denotes the absence of
civil liability for what would be a tortious act but for the relation
between the parties or the status or position of the actor. (Emphasis
added.)
Powell, although using different terminology, appears to make a
similar distinction:16
(i) If the principal is immune from an action in tort, e.g., is a trade
union, or a foreign ambassador, the agent cannot avail himself of that
immunity unless he also is covered by its protection.
(ii) If the principal has a right to do the act in question without
being liable in tort and can do the act through an agent, an agent
who acts within his authority may rely on the right of the principal.
Thus, if the principal has statutory authority to do an act, which
would otherwise be a trespass, and may act through an agent, the
agent also may rely on that statutory authority. (Emphasis added.)
Broadly speaking, "privilege" relates to the act or conduct of the
individual while "immunity" relates to the status or position of the individual. Although the owner is free to discriminate in the private sale
of his house, his freedom on the basis of 'animmunity may well depend
on his continued status as a private owner. It is clear that a broker
who bought houses and sold them as part of the services of his business establishment would not be free to ignore the rights given under
the Act, which, by its own terms, applies to "every business establishment whatsoever." Likewise, the owner himself may forfeit his immunity by going into a similar business, whereas, if a privilege were
involved, such an action on his part would not cause him to lose it.
If the private owner's freedom to sell his house depends on his immunity from the statute, the broker cannot avail himself of that immunity.
Second, even if it be concluded-regardless of the freedom that the
private owner would have in business-that the private owner has a
privilege when he is not in business, the scope of that privilege must
still be determined. Ordinarily, the scope of a privilege is determined
by examining the purpose for which the privilege
is created.
4
The Restatement of Agency provides :
A privilege may, by its character or by the terms upon which it is
granted, be capable of exercise in person only, or it may be capable
45 Id.

at § 217, Comments a, b.

46POWELL, op. cit. supra note 39, at
S7RESTATEMENT (SEcoNn), AGENCY

227

§ 345,

Comment a (1958).
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of exercise also through a servant or other agent. The privilege of
the principal may have been created by common law or by statute,
or it may be the result of a private grant. In any case, the purpose
for which the privilege exists is considered in determining whether
or not it can be exercised by an agent and, if created by statute or
private grant, the language used in creating it. (Emphasis added.)
If it exists as a privilege at all, the privilege of the private owner
is to refuse to sell his house to a citizen because of that citizen's race,
color, religion, ancestry or national origin. The owner's privilege and
the privilege of the broker to refuse his services on the same basis,
both existed at common law. The Unruh Act did not create either
privilege, but it does limit the privilege of the broker. The question is
therefore: Does the Unruh Act require that the broker in his business
establishment not be the agency through which the private owner
exercises his privilege to refuse to sell his house on the basis which is
prohibited to the broker?
The answer to this question depends on the expressed intention of
the legislature as demonstrated principally, by the language used by
it in creating the limit on the privilege of the broker. The express language of section 51 states that the statute shall apply to services "in all
business establishments of every kind whatsoever." It has been shown
that the legislature intended the statute to apply to all of the services
off'red by the broker in his business establishment and that the legislature gave the citizen a positive right in personam to these services.
There is no expressed intention to qualify this powerful right given to
the citizen by leaving the broker free to act, because of his agency,
in a way which would otherwise be clearly prohibited by the statute.
Such an intention, if found at all, must be found outside the words of
the statute as it was passed, and, if found, directly conflicts with the
intention of the legislature as manifested in the statute.
The evidence of a contrary intention depends on words which
were stricken from the Unruh Bill before it was passed into law. As
has been pointed out, the bill, when it was originally introduced,
sought to limit directly the owner's privilege of selling his property
in the same way that the final statute limits the broker's privilege. The
application of the words "to purchase real property" would have limited the private owner's privilege by requiring that he not refuse to
make a private sale of his house on the basis of the race, color, religion,
ancestry or national origin of the buyer. This, the legislature refused
to do. It does not follow from this that the legislature was unwilling
to limit the privilege of the private owner at all. Significantly, it was
at the time of this amendment that the phrase "of every kind whatsoever" was added to the phrase "in all business establishments," reasserting the intention of the legislature to apply the statute, without
exception, in the broad area already designated.
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It is apparent that there is no real basis for contending that the
legislature intended to permit the broker to do an otherwise unlawful
act because of the privilege of the principal.
In Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club,48 the California Supreme Court
expressly rejected the argument of the defendant, under the then existing civil rights statutes,
that the statutes should be strictly construed.
49
The court ruled:
[T]hat rule does not prevail in this state, at least, as to the provisions of the four original codes. The statute in the instant case is
in the Civil Code and it is provided therein: "The rule of common
law, that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly construed,
has no application to this code. The code establishes the law of this
state respecting the subjects to which it relates, and its provisions are
to be liberally construed with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice.
To construe the statute as giving the broker the freedom to refuse
to provide his services because of the privilege of the owner would
be to severely restrict the positive right given to the citizen and to
subvert the clear meaning of the statute as passed by the legislature.
Such a construction does not effect the objects of the statute, or promote justice.
It must therefore be concluded that the broker may not be the
agency through which the private home owner refuses to sell his
house on the basis of the race, color, religion, ancestry or national origin
of the prospective buyer.
Summary
In consenting to the restrictive terms of the agency contract agreement, the broker takes his first affirmative step toward the violation of
his statutory duty to the citizen:
1. The broker continues to be liable for the violation of his statutory duty despite the conflicting contractual duty which arises.
2. The broker continues to be liable for his wrongful acts although
he acts as an agent for the private owner.
3. The owner's freedom to refuse to sell his house because of the
race of the buyer does not give the broker the freedom to do this act
in the name of the owner.

Injunctive Relief
Does the citizen have an injunctive remedy against the broker who
is liable for refusing to sell the house?
Statutory Relief Not Exclusive
It is clear under section 52 that damages may be recovered from
those who violate section 51 of the code. Injunctive relief is also pos48
49

30 Cal. 2d 110, 180 P.2d 321 (1947).
Id. at 113, 180 P.2d at 323.
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sible in order to preserve the rights given to the citizen. The California
Supreme Court, in 1947, made it clear that the statutory remedy in
such cases was not exclusive.
In Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club," plaintiff was ejected from
defendant's race track and told that he would be refused admittance
if he returned. Plaintiff alleged that his ejection was without just
cause and in violation of the then existing civil rights statutes, sections
51, 52, 53 and 54 of the Civil Code. He sought injunctive relief.
The trial court sustained defendant's demurrer with leave to plaintiff to amend to claim only damages.
The California Supreme Court did not consider whether there had
been a violation of section 51, as the alleged facts clearly showed a
violation of section 53. That section provided: "It is unlawful for any
corporation... or the proprietor.., of any... race course ... to
refuse admittance to any person over the age of twenty-one years, who
presents a ticket of admission acquired by purchase, or who tenders
the price thereof for such ticket, and who demands admission to such
place... ."51 Like the present section 52, section 54 prescribed damages for violation of the section which preceded it: "Any person who
is refused admission to any place of amusement contrary to the provisions of the last preceding section, is entitled to recover from the
proprietor.., or from any such... corporation... his actual damages,
and one hundred dollars in addition thereto." 2
The defendant, in the Orloff case in making his demurrer, relied
on the argument that section 53 created a right not known to the common law and that it must, therefore, be strictly construed to the end
that the remedy in section 54 should be exclusive.
The supreme court rejected defendant's argument, stressing that
the Civil Code was "to be liberally construed with a view to effect its
objects and to promote justice." The court observed that the rule of
strict construction did not apply where the remedy provided by the
statute was inadequate, and ruled that: 53
A recovery of compensatory damages and 100 dollars is plainly
inadequate relief in a case of this character... [citing law reviews].
Compensable damages would be extremely difficult if not impossible
to measure and prove. The sum of 100 dollars is a relatively insignificant recovery when we consider that a positive and unequivocal
right has been established and violated.
50 Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, supra note 48.

ra Cal. Stat. 1905, ch. 413, § 3, p. 554 (repealed by Cal. Stat. 1959, ch. 1866, § 3,
p. 4424).
552 Cal. Stat. 1905, ch. 413, § 4, p. 554 (repealed by Cal. Stat. 1959, ch. 1866, § 3,

p. 4424).
53 Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, 30 Cal. 2d 110, 113-14, 180 P.2d 321, 323
(1947).
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The court concluded ". . . [TI hat the statutes here involved do not
purport to exclude all other remedies for the violation of the right conferred... [and that the question] of the propriety of injunctive relief
in the case at bar... [is] a matter hinging upon the general principles
circumscribing relief in equity."5"
No fairer statement can be made about the propriety of injunctive
relief under the present section 51.
The Individual Case
The supreme court in the Orloff case went on to set out the applicable statutory provisions for the use of the injunction in the case
which was before it.55
An injunction may be granted in the following cases: ... 2. When
it appears by the complaint or affidavits that the commission or continuance of some act during the litigation would produce waste, or
great irreparable injury, to a party to the action; . . .4. When pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief; 5. Where it
would be extremely difficult to ascertainthe amount of compensation
which would afford adequate relief. (Emphasis added by the court.)
In reversing the judgment of the lower court, the supreme court
held: "The positive declaration of the personal right and the importance of its preservation together with the inadequacy of the remedy
by way of damages and the 100 dollar penalty furnish sufficient reason
for injunctive relief." 56
The claim of the citizen for injunctive relief against the broker
fully meets the standards set out in the Orloff case. First, a positive
declaration of a personal right has been made by the legislature under
the Unruh Civil Rights Act. Second, it is impossible to ascertain the
amount of compensation which affords adequate relief to the citizen
who has been denied the services of the broker, and third, the pecuniary compensation expressed in section 52 does not afford adequate
relief for a continuing violation of the citizen's personal right.
Thus, the citizen who has not received the broker's services because
of the owner's restriction is able to establish his right to injunctive relief.
Terms of the Order
The purpose of the order for injunctive relief is to effectively secure
the citizen's statutory right to the service which the broker has denied.
Itseems obvious that the court cannot order the broker to make
the sale to the citizen, since the broker lacks the power to do so. Likewise the court cannot compel the private owner to remove the restriction to the broker. It is the broker who has violated the statute and
the order must be directed to him on terms that he has the capacity
to follow.
4 Id. at 115, 180 P.2d at 324.
55Id. at 117-18, 180 P.2d at 325.
51;Id. at 118, 180 P.2d at 325.
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The first affirmative act of the broker which starts him toward the
violation of his statutory duty is his consent to accept the restricted
listing. By accepting the restricted listing, the broker forfeits his
power to prevent his liability to the citizen from arising. It is the
continued acceptance of the restricted listing, once the broker has been
found a violator of the statute, which is a constant threat to the violation of the citizen's right. It is the consent to accept similar listings
in the future, by one who has violated the statute, which may permanently subvert the citizen's right under the statute by continually denying him the broker's service.
Once the broker has been decreed a violator, the order for injunctive relief must require him to terminate all restricted listings which
limit his service to the citizen contrary to the provisions of section 51
of the code and to refuse to consent to accept any such restricted listings in the future. The terms of this order, the broker has the capacity
to follow.
Such an order for injunctive relief will achieve a balance which
accords with the object of section 51 and which promotes justice under
the Civil Code. The order effectively secures the citizen's statutory
right to the services of the broker but it does not create a right to the
house which is sold. The conduct of the broker is regulated according
to the duty which the legislature imposed, but he shares the burden
of this duty with all other brokers who must now seek to guard against
this same liability under the statute.
The owner is still free to sell his house directly to whom he
chooses. If the owner chooses to sell his house through the broker, it
is because he recognizes the economic advantages of his services. It is
because of these economic advantages that the great majority of the
sales of lioiises are made through brokers, and it is because of these
economic advantages that it is encumbant on the order for injunctive
relief to reach the statutory objective of assuring the broker's services
fully and equally to all citizens.
Summary
The citizen has an injunctive remedy against the broker who is
liable for refusing to sell the house:
1. The reasoning of the Orloff case makes it clear that the remedy
of damages in section 52 is not exclusive.
2. The standard for injunctive relief which is set out in the Orloff
case is met by the claim of the citizen against the broker.
3. The suggested order for injunctive relief directs the broker, who
has been adjudged a violator, to terminate all restrictive listings which
limit his service to the citizen contrary to the provisions of section 51
of the code and to refuse to consent to accept any such restricted listings in the future. This will effect the objects of the statute and promote justice under the Civil Code.
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Conclusion
1. Real estate brokers are licensed as business establishments under
the laws of California; and Civil Code section 51 expressly regulates
"business establishments of every kind whatsoever."
2. Therefore, Civil Code sections 51 and 52 subject real estate brokers
to liability if they deny full and equal services to a citizen on the
basis of race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin.
3. Upon meeting the lawful conditions imposed by the broker, the
citizen has a positive right in personam to the full and equal services
of the broker in his business establishment; and the broker has a
positive duty to provide these services.
4. In consenting to the restrictive terms of an agency contract agreement with an owner, the broker takes his first affirmative step toward
the violation of his statutory duty to the citizen, and he continues
to be liable for the violation of this statutory duty despite his conflicting contractual duty or his wrongful acts done as an agent for
an owner.
5. The citizen has an injunctive remedy when the broker is liable, and
the order should direct the broker to terminate all restrictive listings
which limit his service to the citizen contrary to the provisions of
section 51 of the code and to refuse to consent to accept any such
restricted listings in the future.

